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Existing scholarship on the relationship between law and human security is slim.1 Estrada-
Tanck’s deeper consideration of synergies between international human rights law (IHRL) and 
human security is a welcome addition to a body of work in desperate need of expansion. In the 
legal sphere, work on vulnerability and the increased risks of persons to human rights violations 
is frequently encountered but authors do not make the direct link to the body of work on human 
security that resides outside legal scholarship. Furthermore, existing work in other related fields 
such as development, international relations, and security studies do not, for the most part, 
expressly consider law as a method for mobilising human security. An overriding debate for 
the last two decades has been the exact content of human security, which is to be expected. 
Other authors have attempted to move the debate beyond definitional discussion and sought to 
implement human security’s approaches as a second generation of human security.2 Estrada-
Tanck’s book is one such endeavour. 
 Naturally, a monograph cannot cover all aspects of human security nor all situations 
where individuals are faced with threats or exposed to severe vulnerabilities. The book 
develops a thesis that identifies synergies between human security and IHRL by utilising both 
a human security lens to examine IHRL and a rights-based approach to human security. These 
two approaches mean the book can have usages beyond the analysis of violence against women 
and undocumented (female) migrants located in the later chapters and can be operationalised 
in other situations. The book also grounds itself in human rights case law from international 
and regional bodies to give the work substantive legal content. 
 In Chapter 1, Estrada-Tanck identifies the use of vulnerability by the 2012 UN General 
Assembly Resolution defining human security.3 Estrada-Tanck bases her interpretation of 
human security on this resolution due to its strong basis in human rights and because of the fact 
a General Assembly resolution is the product of multilateral state consensus (pp 28-29). The 
chapter argues that a definition of human security can be constructed from existing IHRL and 
include all rights. The book disagrees with Barbara von Tigerstrom that only ‘basic rights’ 
related to ‘survival, livelihood and dignity’ are relevant for human security and postulates that 
once human security is given IHRL content it can be used to identify widespread violations or 
how a violation has a particularly serious impact on a vulnerable population.4 Estrada-Tanck 
envisions human security as first promoting action on threats and vulnerable situations that do 
not fall under the traditional grave categories of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war 
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crimes. Second, human security can contextualise threats and responses for specific 
populations such as women, undocumented migrants, and other ethnic or religious groups (pp 
38-39). 
 Chapter 2 provides greater depth to the book’s choice of risk situation and structural 
vulnerability identifiers. Estrada-Tanck briefly engages with Martha Fineman’s thesis on 
vulnerability but chooses to adopt a similar approach to that of regional human rights bodies 
supporting the identification of vulnerable groups. Authors have argued previously that there 
is no conceptual clash between the approach of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
in identifying vulnerable groups and Fineman’s conclusion that all human beings are 
vulnerable because, “All applicants are vulnerable, but some are more vulnerable that others”.5 
Readers unfamiliar with vulnerability literature may need to refer to other texts to fully assess 
the book’s decision to adopt the approach, especially with regards to the risks associated with 
designating a group as vulnerable.6 Due to the fact the book rests on vulnerability a more 
expansive discussion of the risks associated with such an approach is warranted. The book 
links the vulnerability approach to situations of state responsibility for breaches of human 
rights law where states must prevent the mere risk of violations. The risk of violations can be 
aided by the identification of vulnerable groups by regional human rights courts that in turn 
result in greater positive obligations for the state. 
 In Chapter 3 Article 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 29 
of the Maastricht Principles are identified as ‘human security territory’.7 This is because an 
international environment conducive to human rights is similar to the vital core of human 
security and its role as the enabler of human development. Estrada-Tanck sees these provisions 
as the key link between human rights and human security where human security does not have 
sufficient content to become a new, distinct human right. Instead it is an ‘integrating bridge’ 
between interrelated norms that protect from risks and vulnerabilities (p 97). This link raises 
the important question as to whether it is desirable for human security to be a human right as 
per Article 28? 
 Chapters 4 and 5 take narrower focuses. Chapter 4 looks at violence against women 
and aims to emphasise the need for human security to be given a stronger human rights and 
gender footing. The book argues human rights instruments on women could give content to 
gender aspects of human security and allow human security to have more precision and further 
empower people as rights holders (p 120). Chapter 5 examines undocumented migrants and 
takes a reverse synergy approach to see if human rights law can be enriched through human 
security. The conclusion is that the use of a human security lens increases the visibility of 
vulnerabilities that lead to human rights violations (p 204-212) Particularly, where there are 
‘invisible victims’ or victims who are stigmatised by the law. One of Estrada-Tanck’s examples 
is state-level laws in the US which ‘deepen human insecurity’ and deny fundamental human 
rights to persons based on their immigration status. 
Chapter 6 further narrows undocumented migrants to specifically analyse the situation 
of women. A key issue with undocumented migrants is the fact that much of the vulnerability 
they face is constructed by the law (p 216). The book expresses the view that this is because 
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the state does not provide adequate avenues for undocumented migrants to seek the 
enforcement of their rights and their situation is further exacerbated by states clamping down 
on safe, legal migration routes. The book’s example of the vulnerability of undocumented 
women who suffer abuse from their partner and only come forward to escape such abuse once 
they have legal status is especially eye-opening. The chapter also enumerates case law that has 
or has not applied a human security lens. For example, in MSS v Belgium the ECtHR found 
that the applicant was entitled to sufficient social conditions to live with dignity in line with a 
human security lens. It is interesting that it is not only different courts/committees that interpret 
similar human rights laws differently but Estrada-Tanck shows how the same court can adopt 
wholly different approaches to human security in its case law where the vulnerability of 
applicants has not been expressly considered.  
 Estrada-Tanck gives a range of conclusions that cannot be fully set out here. Generally, 
the book argues that human security makes visible human rights risks that would be otherwise 
hidden and can be a heuristic tool to identify risk situations and structural vulnerabilities that 
require extra attention to prevent human rights violations. This would allow human security to 
operate as the enabling environment expressed in Chapter 3 and would promote 
communication between the state, human rights bodies, civil society, and individuals that 
embody human security’s bottom-up approach, along with the use of non-traditional sources 
of evidence in human rights cases. The book also argues that IHRL, international humanitarian 
law and international criminal law can give normative content to human security and rectify 
many of the definitional issues faced by the concept. The compatibility of sharing normative 
content between human security and public international law requires more detailed attention 
in future work but viewing human security as a heuristic tool with which to analyse legal 
regimes is promising. 
The book articulates well the increased risks that persons in situations of structural 
vulnerability face and reflects the policy-driving purpose of the human security concept. 
Particularly, the idea that if we view law as a living phenomenon then a dialectic process of 
determining the common good resulting in human security encapsulates the purpose this book 
perfectly (p 251). In light of Rebecca Cook’s ‘seamless web’ of law where unrelated areas of 
law can reinforce each other, drawn on by Estrada-Tanck, human security can identify the 
severity of threats and vulnerabilities across a range of fields and connect actors in seeking the 
common good. Human security was incorporated into the foreign policies of several middle 
power states, is used by the UNDP as an analytical framework, and the UN supports human 
security projects globally but the operationalisation of human security must go further.8 
Readers may have reservations with the argument that human security should have IHRL 
content due to assertions that the existing, binding IHRL regime should not be undermined or 
that IHRL has an inherently state security-based approach that is incompatible with human 
security. Nevertheless, Estrada-Tanck’s work demonstrates that the role of states and their 
existing human rights obligations cannot be ignored when analysing human security. There is 
a clear need for states and institutions to work together with civil society and communities on 
lessening the effect of structural vulnerability on human insecurity by adopting a human 
security lens. 
 
Alexander Gilder 
PhD Researcher & Graduate Teaching Fellow 
The City Law School - City, University of London 
Email: Alexander.Gilder@city.ac.uk 
                                               
8 See the UNDP Human Development Reports (global, regional and national) and the work of the UN Trust 
Fund for Human Security. 
